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A Genealogy of State Sovereignty 
Lorenzo Zucca*
A genealogical account of state sovereignty explores the ways in which 
the concept has emerged, evolved, and is in decline today. Sovereignty 
has a theological foundation, and is deeply bound up with the idea of 
God, in particular a voluntarist God, presented as being capable of 
intervening directly in the world. Religious conflicts in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries forced the separation between religion 
and politics, and opened the space for the emergence of a national 
state endowed with sovereignty which has dominated the world until 
now. Today’s rise of international and transnational obligations 
challenges the conventional understanding of state sovereignty, which 
cannot account for the normative density of the global order and the 
corresponding decline of state-based political authority. In order 
to explain that, I contrast two competing understandings of state 
sovereignty: a static one and a dynamic one. The static understanding 
regards sovereignty as absolute within the state territory. The dynamic 
understanding regards sovereignty as evolutionary: according to 
this account, the state is just one possible form that sovereignty can 
take. I conclude by suggesting that the dynamic understanding of 
state sovereignty is better suited to explaining the decline of state 
sovereignty. 
IntroductIon
In the beginning there was no national state. Perhaps we need not go so far 
back for the proposition to be true. In the middle ages, there was no national 
state. Instead, there was competition between the Empire and the Church, both 
vying for political authority. Needless to say, the protagonist of this conflict 
is God; what is at stake is not its existence, but its willingness to interfere in 
world matters. According to the Divine Command Theory — widespread in 
Medieval Europe — God is the source of all moral and legal obligations.1
* King’s College London. 
1 PhiliP Quinn, Divine CommanDs anD moral reQuirements (1978).
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The God of the Hebrew Bible is a sovereign lawgiver, who punishes 
disobedience and rewards obedience. In the middle ages, sovereign authority 
took different forms: the universal ambition of Empire, the universal realm 
of the Catholic Church, or the narrow confines of city-states. These political 
authorities were competing to fill a political vacuum. It is in this vacuum that 
the modern state appeared, developed, and conquered the world. 
Today’s world faces a vacuum of political authority that sovereign states 
are increasingly at greater pains to address. To understand the crisis of political 
authority, I propose to engage in a genealogical explanation of state sovereignty. 
The goal is to understand the evolution of state sovereignty by exploring its 
roots and examining how the idea emerged and developed. This may give 
us a glimpse at why it is declining today and how that decline is coming 
about. There are two dimensions to state sovereignty here: a philosophical 
dimension that focuses on the ground of the concept of sovereign authority, 
and a political dimension that engages with the form that that authority takes, 
namely the state. At this point, I need to make a few cautionary points about 
the methodology. The narrative I am offering here is not exhaustive. Instead 
it begins with three ideal models of sovereign authority and tracks the way 
in which they have shaped the political space and ultimately crystallized into 
the state. There is a tension between ideal models and political practice that I 
want to explore here: is the state sovereign because it is blessed with moral or 
theological justification, or has it emerged as the ultimate authority because of 
historical and practical necessity? I will make a case for the latter hypothesis. 
The first ideal model of sovereignty grounds authority on revelation — let 
us call it Jerusalem. Here the ground of sovereign authority is clear; however, 
this ideal model of sovereign authority is unclear as to which form should 
represent godly authority in the world. The second ideal model grounds 
authority on reason — let us call it Athens. Human beings are thought to be 
capable of understanding the world as it is through the use of natural reason. 
This changes the ground of political authority, since humans are no longer 
required to interpret the will of the sovereign religious authority, but instead 
they can rely on their natural reason to understand the order that was created 
and that rules our societies. 
The third model is the expression of a purely political and purely secular 
mindset. Let us call it Rome. It is secular in opposition to Jerusalem in an 
obvious way. It is also secular in opposition to Athens in the sense that it rejects 
a quasi-religious belief in reason. It is political in the sense that it does not aim 
to provide a ground for authority. Instead, Rome dissociates the political form 
from the ground of authority and prioritizes the former above the latter: the 
political form of the sovereign state emerged as a practical solution and not 
as the embodiment of reason or revelation. However, Athens and Jerusalem 
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claimed the victory and shared the glory: the realm of reason is officially 
separated from the realm of revelation, but in practice one legitimizes the 
other and together they claim to ground the practice of politics. Rome rejects 
theology and freestanding normative thinking; instead, it attempts to build 
a realistic account of political authority that explains the emergence of the 
state as a political necessity. 
This Article is divided into three parts: the emergence, consolidation 
and decline of state sovereignty. Part I examines the emergence of state 
sovereignty, where I contrast the theological concept of sovereignty with the 
political emergence of the state. In Part II, I suggest that the consolidation of 
state sovereignty depends on the separation between politics and religion: the 
modern state is a response to the religious conflicts. A dualism between Athens 
and Jerusalem is introduced, only to guarantee reciprocal legitimation. The 
triumph of state sovereignty in the seventeenth century is in reality a victory 
for Rome: power is the precondition of justice. However, it is possible to 
distinguish two competing accounts of Rome. On the one hand, we have the 
conventional Hobbesian account, which presents political authority as static: 
once sovereignty is posited, it is absolute and exclusive. Either the state is 
sovereign and there is no other authority beyond it, or it is not sovereign and 
therefore it is not a state. On the other hand, there is an evolutionary account 
of state sovereignty that understands political authority from a biological 
viewpoint: political authorities emerge, consolidate and decline on the basis 
of how well they do their job and secure the interests of the community in 
a way that is open to contestation. In Part III, I contrast the evolutionary 
understanding of sovereignty to the static one in order to explain the decline 
of the state and the rise of international institutions. 
I. two VIews of soVereIgnty and the  
emergence of the state
A. Medieval Origins: Political Authorities and Political Vacuum in 
Medieval Europe 
In the fourteenth century, there is a standoff between political authorities: 
neither the Church nor the Empire de facto exercises full political authority 
over the world; but they do so to a limited extent. There is a political vacuum 
that is perceived all over Europe, and it is part and parcel of a looming political 
crisis that will be transformed into an epochal change of the world order 
during the seventeenth century. In this vacuum, city-states exercise growing 
power. They are the paradigm of political authority even if the internal struggle 
between factions is often more a matter of private interests than a question 
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of public good. An egregious example of a city-state that struggles between 
competing factions is Medieval Florence where pro-papist and pro-emperor 
factions cannot find ground of agreement. 
In November 1301, Dante — the famous poet — goes to Rome as a 
diplomatic envoy of Florence to negotiate a peace deal with Pope Boniface. 
The peace talks fail miserably, since the Pope has little interest in a truce. A 
few months later, he marches into Florence with his troops in order to reinstate 
the pro-papal faction (Guelfi Neri). Dante is tried and convicted in absentia 
on January 27, 1302. He’s condemned for graft and misuse of public funds. 
He will have to live in exile for the rest of his life. Dante is one of the most 
astute political commentators of this period. His writings and life experience 
testify to a deep interest in political authority and justice.2 
During his life, Dante was scarred by unfair and ungrounded accusations. 
The trial in which he stood accused did not rely on factual evidence, but on 
the opinion of the people. Dante would be ever after an advocate of strong 
retributive justice — to every person it is due. Dante’s Divine Comedy3 is the 
journey of a living man through Inferno, Purgatory and Paradise where God’s 
justice rules arithmetically and relies on objective evidence, as opposed to 
the ways in which justice works in the world. The afterworld of the Divine 
Comedy is based on that very principle. Each individual is sent to the correct 
emplacement that corresponds to the actual wrong committed on earth. 
Divine justice is imparted by God’s judges that live at the gates of Inferno, 
Purgatory or Paradise. 
In Dante’s worldview, political authority has a theological ground: Jerusalem 
or revelation. God reveals to us the true goal of political societies: to be ordered 
according to the principles of divine justice. Of course, human beings are 
imperfect, so they frequently stray from the path of divine justice. But at the 
same time, human beings are endowed with natural reason and so they are 
capable of ascertaining the goal that has been set by God. In this way, reason 
becomes an ally of revelation; Athens comes in aid of Jerusalem. This is the 
gist of the Thomistic tradition embraced by Dante in his political treatise De 
Monarchia, which argues in favor of a new Emperor capable of bringing justice 
to the world through the enforcement of the law.4 Dante has a preference for 
a political authority on earth that has universal aspirations. He wishes that a 
2 See Dante alighieri, De monarChia [the monarChy] (Prue Shaw ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996) (1312).
3 Dante alighieri, the Divine ComeDy (David H. Higgins ed., C.H. Sisson trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
4 Id.
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 16.2 (2015)
2015] A Genealogy of State Sovereignty 403
new Emperor could appear and exercise the necessary universal authority to 
bring back order to a deeply fragmented Europe. 
Dante bemoans the lack of a reliable system of legal enforcement in the real 
world. The law is there to be applied, but there is no authority that is strong 
enough for this job. Dante is committed to the ius commune — the system 
of law inherited from the Romans and reenacted in the corpus juris. The ius 
commune is regarded as the product of natural reason, reflecting the real order 
of the world. Dante’s political faction (White Guelphs) is decided to wage 
a war against the Black Guelphs for not respecting the law (ius commune). 
The Black Guelphs, who run city-states like Florence, do not want to be 
in charge of the application of the ius commune; rather, they want to have 
full jurisdictional autonomy to produce the norms they want and to apply 
them accordingly. In other words, cities like Florence are already claiming 
the superiority of lex over ius. Dante is opposed to such a view of law (lex), 
which he regards as particularistic and producing injustices, as it is merely 
the product of factional majority interests, rather than a well-established body 
of legal principles (ius), which has a clear universal appeal. Instead, Dante 
advocates a model in which local authorities are free to the extent that they 
apply the existing law (ius commune). 
The relation between law and political authority is a very important 
issue in Medieval Europe. The problem is between bounded and unbounded 
political authority. The debate at that point in time is encapsulated in the 
legal concept of arbitrium. Liberum Arbitrium does not mean to exercise 
completely unfettered sovereign power. Instead, it means to exercise weak 
discretion in a legal sense. Legal principles (ius) are there to be applied, but 
the interpreter has weak discretion to decide how best to apply them. This 
excludes the idea of a political authority that creates standards ex nihilo. No 
political authority could do that according to the medieval understanding of 
law. For medieval lawyers, law could never be reduced to the legislation of a 
centralized sovereign power, since there was no such power. In other words, 
ius could never be reduced to lex. In fact, the deepest sense of law refers 
to universally binding norms that are superior to the political authority of 
the Pope and the Emperor. No sovereign power is purely unbounded at the 
normative level for Dante. Machiavelli would challenge precisely that medieval 
conjecture: what matters is not the normative justification of authority, but 
the actual exercise of authority. 
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B. The Sovereign and the City-State 
Two centuries later, it was Machiavelli’s turn to be thrown out of the Florentine 
government.5 In 1512, the Republic of Florence is overturned by the Medici’s 
army aided by the Spaniards. Machiavelli is imprisoned and tortured. He then 
takes up residence outside the walls of Florence. His reaction is very different 
from Dante’s: Machiavelli desperately tries to convince the ruling power that 
he is fit to work for the Prince of the city, Lorenzo de’ Medici. Machiavelli’s 
understanding of politics and political authority is informed by a deep realism: 
politics needs to be separated from ethics.6 Rome is independent from Athens. 
Machiavelli is an ante litteram empirical political scientist, who is concerned 
with experience and historical facts and rejects the centrality of freestanding 
normative thinking.7 Machiavelli also rejects the influence of theology, in 
particular revelation as a ground of political authority. He is the first secular 
political thinker, who really believes that political authority should free itself 
from the shackles of religious and moralizing influences.8 To continue the 
metaphor, Jerusalem has no place in the understanding of politics. Machiavelli 
focuses on how political authority really works, not how it should be justified. 
Christianity is the object of various political critiques expressed by 
Machiavelli. In particular, the central problem connected with a Christian 
understanding of politics is its hopeless insistence on vague and lofty ideals 
that inevitably are flouted by political rulers. Christian values and Aristotelian 
teleology join forces to justify the increasing political role of the Catholic 
Church on the basis of imaginary ideals. This leaves the people the prey of 
Fortuna, or God’s providence. Instead, Machiavelli advocates a naturalistic 
understanding of human abilities. People, and rulers in particular, have to 
rely on their natural inclinations to constantly maximize their control over 
the external world; being fettered by unnatural moral constraints only makes 
them weak. They should be strong and dominate their fortune, rather than 
be dominated by it. 
5 Quentin skinner, maChiavelli: a very short introDuCtion (2001).
6 This is one way of introducing the normative-naturalist dichotomy. 
7 But he does not deny altogether the force of normative standards; he simply 
insists that they are not crucial in determining the effectiveness of political 
authority.
8 To be precise, secular liberation can only happen at the level of the ruling class. 
The masses, on the other hand, are better controlled if they believe in religion, 
which instills in them the feeling of piety. See J.g.a. PoCoCk, the maChiavellian 
moment: Florentine PolitiCal thought anD the atlantiC rePubliCan traDition 
(1975).
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Machiavelli is the first student of politics that conceives of the state in 
a modern way: it is neither the rule of god on earth (Jerusalem), nor the 
institutional embodiment of reason (Athens). Rather, it stands for an impersonal 
rule that has the monopoly of coercion over a boundary-defined territory. The 
idea of Stato captures the actual ability to rule of a political authority rather 
than its moral or theological fitness to do so. Any political institution that can 
acquire, enforce and maintain coercive authority deserves the name of state.9 
The political vacuum bemoaned by Dante can now be filled by the actual 
practice of politics. While Dante aspired to a universalist form of political 
authority, namely the Empire (backed by the Church), and despised the City 
for its parochial particularism, Machiavelli would have been very happy to 
see the city-state model flourish. Machiavelli’s political preferences — just 
like Dante’s — were doomed to fail in the attempt to secure a stable form of 
government. Both the universal aspirations of the Church and the particular 
ambition of the city-state are incapable of bringing order to the world. There 
is a space for a new entity to emerge: it is the rule of absolute monarchy with 
its state sovereignty.
The lesson of Machiavelli can be summarized as follows: Rome is superior 
because it exercises authority effectively, not because it is blessed by gods or 
justified by morals. The sovereign that mismanages the state runs a very high 
risk of losing its status as a coercive authority. The sovereign has to have a 
sharp understanding of, and should be ready to act upon, the interests of the 
state. If this is not the case, then political authority crumbles. This is a non-
moralistic, non-theological account of the rise and fall of political authorities. 
The sovereign’s ultimate goal is to maintain itself in power by whatever means 
and to preserve the territorial integrity of its state. This would also come to 
be a realistic account of political authority within and beyond the state that 
has in fact dominated most accounts of international relations.10 
Rome’s greatness, and the greatness of its laws, is to be explained by 
reference to an important distinction that we should not overlook. Machiavelli 
believes that to live safely (vivere sicuro) is one thing and to live freely (vivere 
libero) another.11 To live safely implies the existence of a political authority 
that applies the laws robustly and instils fear and obedience in the citizens. 
An example of such a political authority is the French kingdom that applies 
the law swiftly through the hard work of the parliaments (regional institutions 
9 This goes against the grain of the etymology: status means something that 
preserves its own essence unchanged.
10 See hans J. morgenthau, PolitiCs among nations: the struggle For Power 
anD PeaCe (4th ed. 1967).
11 niCColo maChiavelli, DisCourses on livy (Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (1531). 
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of law’s implementation). At the same time, the French kingdom disarmed 
its citizens, preventing them from taking the protection of the country into 
their hands. 
Vivere libero is an altogether different thing and it is the crux of the Roman 
Republic. Rome empowered its citizens by arming them and giving them the 
responsibility to actively protect the republic from external aggression and 
from internal mismanagement. Machiavelli goes against the grain: many 
have argued that the decline of Rome was to be explained by reference to its 
internecine conflicts. Instead, Machiavelli argues that class conflict within 
the republic is what maintains the polity alive and well and free from the 
accumulation of power in the hands of bad rulers. Conflict and pluralism 
are the source of a healthy republic that exercises political authority while 
maintaining a great degree of freedom. Rome is great because it refuses to 
embrace one religion or one set of moral values. Instead, it embraces social 
conflict as the source of its political vitality, as well as the check against 
arbitrary use of power.
Conflict is at the core of Machiavelli’s political thinking.12 A state is free 
when the ruler and the ruled are constantly checking each other. Machiavelli 
does not believe in high moral standards to guide the Prince. Not that this 
leaves the Prince standard-less. But there is something more important than 
moral standards: it is effective governance. Effective governance may even 
include actions that are in principle wrong, but are geared to achieving 
important goals for the sake of the state’s interest. 
Machiavelli rejects philosophical and theological moralism. He’s nearly 
on his own on that. A plethora of philosophers have stepped in to defend 
theology and normative political thinking. Machiavelli’s name is bound up 
with a vision of politics that is highly despised because of its association with 
wrongdoing.13 However, the important insight that is often overlooked is that 
philosophers create an unrealistic image of human nature and would like to see 
political regimes reflect that image, only to despair when humanity exhibits 
all its faults in the realization of political order. Machiavelli is a realist and a 
naturalist in the sense that he wants to explain political authority beginning 
with how human society really works in practice, rather than by focusing on 
how it ought to work in theory. 
Dante’s conception of political authority was heavily reliant on the supremacy 
of divine revelation. The sovereign on earth, the Emperor, should aspire to 
be guided by divine light. The Emperor’s authority is universal and knows 
12 FiliPPo Del luCChese, ConFliCt, Power anD multituDe in maChiavelli anD 
sPinoza (2010).
13 leo strauss, thoughts on maChiavelli (1995).
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no bounds as long as its goal is to bring to earth the principles inscribed in 
divine justice. Jerusalem is the ultimate horizon of political authority. Contrast 
that picture with that of Machiavelli: Rome’s political greatness has nothing 
to do with religious or moral standards. Its body politic is healthy because it 
allows for disagreement and conflict rather than rigidity and moralism. The 
sovereign authority is he who rules efficiently over the body politic. Machiavelli 
formulated for the first time the concept of the state as an impersonal form 
of rule that has authority over a bounded territory.14 
II. the consolIdatIon of state soVereIgnty 
A. Religious Wars and the Rise of State Sovereignty
The last obstacle that needed to be overcome in order to seal the supremacy 
of the state over its territory was the secular power of the Catholic Church. 
In 1517, ten years prior to Machiavelli’s death, Martin Luther published his 
95 Theses criticizing the terrestrial power of the Church.15 His voice and 
aspiration are extraterritorial and his political aim is to influence politics 
globally, if not to exercise it directly. Through the Holy Roman Empire, and 
a myriad other political posts occupied by the clergy, the Church rules and 
attempts to maintain socio-cultural homogeneity. For centuries, the Church 
had levied taxes, administered cities and delivered justice, among many other 
things. This multiplied the opportunities for corruption and worsened the 
image of the Church. Martin Luther argued that the Church should be stripped 
of all its temporal and ecclesiastical powers. It should be brought back to an 
image of spiritual purity. Its involvement in the exercise of temporal power 
only tarnished the image of religion, which needed to revert to its original 
greatness. The devastating attack on the morality of the Church left an even 
bigger hole in the political landscape. Once the extraterritorial reach of the 
Church had been swept aside, the political vacuum could be more easily filled 
by local princes exercising territorial authority, with no extraterritorial mission. 
Luther introduced a fundamental dualism between the duties of spiritual 
and temporal leaders. The dualism was sharp and clear: on one hand there is 
a spiritual domain, which involves specific spiritual duties, and on the other 
there is a temporal domain, with its own specific duties. The two domains 
foster the good of Christians in different non-overlapping ways. This dualism 
14 Quentin skinner, the FounDations oF moDern PolitiCal thought, volume i: 
the renaissanCe (1978).
15 erwin iserloh, the theses were not PosteD: luther between reForm anD 
reFormation (Jared Wicks, S.J., trans., 1968).
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frees the rule of local princes from the interference of the Pope and the 
Catholic Church.16 In theory, this is an attempt to moralize the political life of 
the whole of Europe. The idea was to separate the domain of Jerusalem from 
those of Athens and Rome. It is an attempt to define away the theological-
political conflict by positing completely independent domains of action. In 
practice, it sets the stage for the most brutal religious conflict the world has 
ever witnessed. Protestants and Catholics waged war on one another for over 
a hundred years with a phenomenal degree of violence that peaked during 
the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). 
Religious wars in Europe threatened the relative order of the world as 
organized in the name of God’s decrees. God is no longer a source of order and 
union, but becomes a reason to fight and divide the political realm occupied 
by the Empire and the Church. In order to bring order to a divided world, legal 
and political thinkers attempt to argue for an alternative ground of authority, 
where the will of God is less central in dictating the moral and legal laws. 
Religious wars usher in the modern world where the divine command theory 
of authority is challenged on the basis of the understanding of human nature.
Grotius, for example, suggests that moral and legal obligations upon public 
and private actors would exist objectively even if we were to concede that 
God does not exist. This move introduces a distinction between voluntary 
and non-voluntary divine law. From this perspective, international law is the 
son of mutual consent between states. Mutual consent between states is the 
son of natural law. “But the mother of municipal law (and international law) 
is that obligation which arises from mutual consent; and since this obligation 
derives its force from the law of nature, nature may be considered, so to say, 
the great-grandmother of municipal law (and international law).”17 Binding 
obligations at the international level depend on non-voluntary divine law. 
In this way, Grotius attempts to reconcile Jerusalem and Athens in order 
to shape international relations; but reality is far removed from Grotius’s 
aspirations: the world of international relations in the seventeenth century is 
ruled by brute power.
On February 25, 1603, a Dutch ship seized a Portuguese merchant boat 
in the Straits of Singapore. Grotius, then still a young Dutch lawyer, wrote a 
Memorandum for the defense. The Memorandum’s central argument contained 
a radical argument: a private company could engage in lawful acts of war 
16 It is also important to stress that Luther’s political theology makes no room for 
extra-territorial communities and paves the way for the fundamental unity and 
territoriality of the state.
17 hugo grotius, on the law oF war anD PeaCe 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) 
(1625).
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against other merchants with the aim of protecting the natural law that mandated 
freedom of trade and navigation. The central idea was that Dutch private 
companies had a natural right to resist the constant aggression of Portuguese 
and Spanish forces that wanted to prevent safe trade with Asian princes. In 
those cases, private actors would qualify as fully-fledged international actors. 
The Memorandum was put aside and forgotten: it was found many centuries 
later and published under the title De Jure Praedae.18 The manuscript could 
not be published when it was written, as it would have fueled even more hatred 
between Catholic Portugal and Protestant Holland. It is a world not ruled by 
morality or religion, but by the sheer use of power. The United Provinces 
of Holland are a small actor on this global stage. They obviously have an 
interest in the existence of an overarching law of nations that is dependent 
on neither the will of God nor the will of nations, but merely on objective 
moral principles. 
Grotius’s project is not so much focused on human law, as it is interested 
in divine law of the non-voluntary type, otherwise known as natural law. He 
attempts to ground natural law’s normativity on some objective aspects of 
human nature. He looked into human nature to discern an independent ability 
to determine one’s behavior on the basis of right reason. In the preamble 
to the Law of War and Peace, he puts forward the thesis that became very 
famous: “etiamsi daremus, quod sine summo scelere dari nequit, Deum non 
esse.”19 Stephen Darwall has suggested that Grotius is the founder of modern 
moral philosophy because he models the moral law after central aspects of 
human law.20 More precisely, moral law is explained by reference to “quasi 
juridical” features such as obligation and blame. Ancient moral philosophy 
does not put obligations at its center, but focuses instead on virtues and more 
generally on the appraisal of human beings.21 
Modern moral philosophy, by contrast, focuses on the direction of behavior. 
The way it does so is by engaging the human capacity of self-determination.22 
This capacity is distinctively human, as it is to be found only in human animals 
and is what distinguishes them from other nonhuman animals. It seems correct 
18 hugo grotius, Commentary on the law oF Prize anD booty (Liberty Fund 
2006) (1603).
19 grotius, supra note 17 (“[E]ven if we should assume the impossible, that there 
is no God or that he does not care for human affairs.”). 
20 stePhen Darwall, Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy, in 
honor, history anD relationshiP, essays in seConD Personal ethiCs ii 157 
(2013). 
21 Thomas Pink, Law and the Normativity of Obligation, 5 JurisPruDenCe 1 (2014).
22 G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in virtue ethiCs 26 (Roger 
Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1998).
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to say that Grotius is the forerunner of the moral law as modeled after “quasi 
juridical notions.” But this leaves the door open to many vexing questions. 
First of all, it is unclear what makes a notion juridical or quasi-juridical. More 
importantly, this kind of project must address the challenge formulated by 
Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe.23 The challenge is the following: 
moral law, like any other law, requires a legislator that issues the directives 
to be followed. God is the legislator of the moral law. Once morality (the 
moral law) is thought to have force independently, it comes apart in our hands. 
By trying to provide an alternative to the theory of divine command, 
Grotius and all those who followed him brought out the enormous question of 
normativity, along with the problem of political motivation: how can people 
be motivated to obey a set of rules if not out of fear of punishment? The divine 
command theory had an easy job in instilling obedience: God commanded 
and subjects obeyed; disobedience would be met with divine punishment, 
so subjects would obey out of fear of punishment: fear motivated obedience. 
The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary divine law — between 
God’s command and God’s establishment of an objective order of principles 
— attempts to make room for both Jerusalem and Athens: revelation would 
play a part in understanding voluntary divine law, while reason would play 
a part in understanding the objective order of principles. 
Human laws are themselves both voluntary and non-voluntary: the meeting 
of human wills produces some laws, while others track existing objective 
principles. To the extent that they rely on the meeting of human wills, human 
laws are locally produced and legitimized. But there is a set of human laws 
that are not produced by humans, but simply reflect objective moral principles. 
The same applies to international law. Some treaties depend on the will of 
nations, but more importantly some international laws encapsulate objective 
principles that are universally valid. Jerusalem and Athens each has its place. 
However, peace did not come from the recognition of an international political 
authority capable of imposing obligations on warring factions. Instead, peace 
came with the official recognition of the supreme authority of territorially 
bounded entities. 
International law that grounds obligations for state and non-state actors is 
ultimately based on the non-voluntary law of nature, according to Grotius. Ius 
is superior to lex. Here ius is to be understood as objective right — it is the 
overarching moral standard that guides the action of states and individuals. 
Objective right is not dependent on the exercise of will — it is antecedent to 
human will and independent of divine will. To this extent, embryonic nation-
states were under obligations ascertained by the pure use of natural reason. 
23 Id.
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The problem is that obligations imposed by natural reason on state and non-
state actors are not backed up by coercive force. Religious wars eliminated 
any possibility of rational agreement between warring religions. Hence the 
pragmatic solution brought about by the Augsburg and the Westphalia peace 
treaties is to parcel out the European political space into discrete territories 
where religious homogeneity can be engineered through the application of 
the principle: one kingdom, one religion (ejus regio et cujus religio). 
B. The Triumph of Territorially Bounded Sovereigns 
Once God is demoted as the legislator of the global order, there is a rush to 
find alternative ways to ground the normativity of morality and law. The two 
come apart. Grotius proposes his idea of the moral law inscribed in the nature 
of human beings in the form of natural sociability.24 This imposes only very 
thin obligations at the international level — essentially similar to what we 
now call ius cogens. 
Hobbes instead brings back God to justify the exercise of absolute authority 
within the frame of the national state alone (and also explains the lack of 
authority behind the state): the Leviathan is a personified authority on earth 
that looks like the estranged God.25 It is the sole authority that can really 
motivate people to obey human laws out of fear. The state is the only locus 
of legal obligation — outside the state there is no justice.26 And anything 
goes. International law has remained since then a very thin window dressing 
for the exploitation of the earth. The road that runs from Grotius to Hobbes 
is the road that has characterized the Westphalian story of the world.27 The 
lack of political authority of international law can be explained in terms of 
political motivation. There is very little that motivates states to comply with 
international legal norms. Fear of punishment is largely hypothetical. 
For Hobbes, it is not possible to ascertain an objective moral standard (ius) 
above and beyond the state. Lex, the law that is produced by the sovereign 
body, is the only law that can be ascertained, understood and applied; lex is the 
only law that matters. Ius loses its importance in Hobbes’s account because it 
24 Darwall, supra note 20.
25 See thomas hobbes, leviathan 11 (BiblioBazaar 2008) (1651).
26 thomas nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, in seCular PhilosoPhy anD 
the religious temPerament 61 (2012); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Extra 
Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?, 34 Phil. & Pub. aFF. 147 (2006).
27 Grotius’s idea of ius is much broader than Hobbes’s idea of lex. Following in the 
footsteps of Hobbes means to reduce the idea of law to a very bare minimum. 
The state also will be endowed with a sense of normativity. 
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cannot be ascertained nor does it come with an appropriate threat that would 
motivate people to obey it. So if we contrast Grotius and Hobbes in terms of 
state sovereignty, the former believes that there are objective principles (ius) 
that bind political authorities, whereas the latter believes that there is no law 
beyond the sovereign power of the state. For Hobbes, the international order 
is akin to the state of nature in which all states exercise bare power against 
one another. Stability can only be created by the constitution of sovereign 
authority over a defined territory. For Grotius, the world order’s stability can 
be promoted through ascertaining a moral order that is distinguished from 
God’s will. 
Needless to say, the account that has turned out to be more popular is the 
Hobbesian one. We are still very much in the spell of that account of state 
sovereignty, which implies two ingredients. First, state sovereignty means full 
responsibility on the part of the ruler to run the internal business of the state by 
wielding its own normative powers. Second, state sovereignty means freedom 
from external interference in the way national business is run. It matters little 
if the sovereign power is acting rightly or wrongly from the viewpoint of 
international moral standards. State sovereignty creates a protective buffer 
that screens the sovereign authority from criticism and interference.
Hobbes’s account certainly captured something important about political 
authority in the seventeenth century.28 The national state is the main political 
framework capable of bringing stability and security. Other frameworks had 
proved incapable of doing so. The subsequent story of the global order tells us 
that the most important obligation for each national state is indeed to maintain 
stability and security internally. That is the chief legal and moral obligation 
that is tied in with the creation of the Westphalian international order. In fact, 
the international order depends on the respect of state sovereignty on the part 
of every player: respect of state sovereignty is by definition the highest — 
and the only — obligation of states. Hobbes presents national states as the 
necessary instrument to accomplish a number of desirable political goals.29 
28 But are they really necessary or purely contingent? To understand this, we have 
to observe that the world in which we live is no longer Hobbes’s world. There is 
a web of political authorities beyond the state that create obligations on the state 
and question the fundamental nature of the national state’s sovereign authority.
29 Hobbes’s image of the Leviathan as the sovereign political authority provided 
a justification for a new form of political authority: the nation-state; and the 
preferred regime was absolute monarchy, where the sovereign king represented 
the ultimate and unbounded source of political authority. The will of the sovereign 
king is the ultimate source of law, above which there is nothing. Human law 
became the most important form of human regulation. 
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Let me summarize the journey so far: we moved from a conception of 
sovereignty that was transcendental, where God was the supreme sovereign 
whose command had ultimate authority, to Hobbes’s conception of political 
authority which is immanent and rooted in the political reality, even if it 
merely transposes the idea of supreme commander to the state. 
III. the declIne of state soVereIgnty 
Hobbes’s understanding of state sovereignty is static and binary. Once posited, 
sovereignty cannot evolve. It is a given of the political system and it discriminates 
between the orderly modern state and the chaotic international sphere that 
resembles the state of nature where conflict with one another is the norm. 
With such a static and binary view of state sovereignty, it was possible to 
justify absolute monarchies in Europe. It is not as easy to explain the slow 
decline of modern nation-states today and their struggle to cope with the 
global crisis the world faces. In this Part, I want to contrast Hobbes’s theory 
of political authority with Spinoza’s. Both develop a secular and immanent 
explanation of politics. However, Spinoza’s view is dynamic and unitary as 
opposed to Hobbes’s. 
Spinoza approves of Hobbes’s naturalistic credentials only to a point. 
Spinoza points out that Hobbes abandons his commitment to naturalism when 
he grounds the political legitimacy of the sovereign on the transferability of 
the natural right of people.30 Hobbes places on consent a normative force 
that has nothing to do with the reality of political power. Consent merely 
creates out of thin air the justification for the exercise of power: it vests 
power with legitimacy and respectability, but the cloak of consent is fictional 
and presupposes the existence of a normative power that has no real basis. 
Moreover, to conceive of natural rights as an entitlement — something that 
someone owns and can transfer, rather than something inherent to one’s persona 
and not transferable — is further proof of a non-naturalistic viewpoint. The 
idea that we can transfer our natural rights makes them look artificial and 
detachable from human nature. It is this artificial device that Hobbes uses 
to distinguish between actual power and a legitimate right to rule. To this 
extent at least, Hobbes still represents the tradition of natural law theory that 
Spinoza is trying to overcome with a genuinely naturalistic approach that 
makes no space for theological notions. Spinoza is following in Machiavelli’s 
footsteps, while at the same time offering a naturalistic ethical system that 
30 baruCh sPinoza, Letter 50, in ComPlete works 891 (Michael L. Morgan ed., 
2002).
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provides guidance to individuals and states. He is bringing Athens and Rome 
back together, while leaving aside Jerusalem.
More generally, Spinoza’s account regards political communities as 
comparable to biological entities. Power evolves constantly and so does the 
relation between the ruler and the ruled. There is neither original nor ongoing 
consent, but rather a constant assessment of the political community’s ability 
to protect and promote vital interests. If the political community ceases to 
deliver on its promise, then its decay begins, and can be more or less slow; 
more or less brutal. By contrast, Hobbes thinks like a physicist. Once state 
sovereignty is posited through the fiction of consent, then it is justified to 
do whatever it takes to protect the community from internal or external 
aggression. Consent works as an all or nothing device: as a result, it does 
not admit of decline and decay. Either it is there or it is not, but it does not 
evolve. By making consent so central to his theory, Hobbes subjects his views 
of political authority to an external moral standard, rather than providing a 
full-blown naturalistic explanation. Spinoza on the contrary provides a full-
blown evolutionary theory of state sovereignty.
A. Spinoza’s Naturalism 
Spinoza’s record must be set straight. One of the most promising students 
of the Torah in Amsterdam, Spinoza quickly becomes more knowledgeable 
than his masters, to the point of challenging their authority and that of the Old 
Testament. Spinoza is attempting to give a new meaning to divine law. He 
believes that what the Hebrew people regard as divine law is nothing other 
than human law, presented as divine to motivate people into obedience. Moses 
provided a people with a set of laws that they would regard as mirroring their 
identity and motivating regular behavior of obedience. These laws were not 
universal, but very much specific to the history of one given people. When 
Spinoza talks about divine law, he does not refer to those laws that have been 
handed down to men through revelation. Rather, divine laws are those laws 
that are part and parcel of the natural world and are universal for that reason.
Spinoza does not want to introduce an artificial dualism between God 
and Nature. Spinoza develops an immanent metaphysical monism (IMM) 
according to which reality can be explained by reference to a single principle 
from which everything flows. Spinoza calls it “Deus sive Natura,” God or 
Nature.31 There is no dualism between the two, no distinction to be drawn: 
31 baruCh sPinoza, Ethics, in ComPlete works, supra note 30, at 213. Spinoza 
abandons altogether the Judeo-Christian image of God as an anthropomorphic 
God who is capable of willing good and bad. What has prevented ethics from 
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the two are one and the same thing. One can contrast it with Grotius’s motto: 
Etiamsi Daremus (even if we were to concede that there is no God).32 Grotius 
upheld dualism between divine laws and human laws in order to create the 
false idea of a normativity springing from nature, in particular from the 
distinctive nature of human beings. There is no need to declare the godlike 
nature of men.33 Spinoza’s God or Nature is present in the world in which we 
live. Spinoza’s IMM asks us to think of the world as the sole single reality that 
human beings can make sense of. The afterlife or a transcendent dimension 
do not belong to this world and cannot be explained, nor can they provide 
meaningful information as to what ethical or political standards should look 
like. To this extent at least, Hobbes and Spinoza have a similar starting point: 
their account is firmly rooted in this world and inspired by a scientific outlook.
Secondly, IMM is the background for Spinoza’s immanent ethical monism 
(IEM): we live in a world ordered by virtue of natural laws; human beings, 
like any other living beings, are part of this world and subject to natural laws. 
So in order to make sense of ethical requirements, we have to know what 
are the natural laws that regulate the place of human beings in the world, 
rather than postulate an independent domain of moral values that exercises 
its gravitational pull on human beings independently of natural laws. The 
normative domain (the domain of values), if it exists at all, is subject to all the 
natural laws that apply to all living beings. Ultimately, in fact, all moral laws 
could be explained by reference to natural laws. The problem lies in the fact 
flourishing is not religion, but a very precise picture of deity that is monotheistic and 
anthropomorphic. Spinoza presents God instead not as a faraway, transcendental 
being who resembles man, but as an immanent presence on earth that inspires 
awe and admiration in the same way that nature inspires awe and admiration. God 
is Nature. Spinoza’s position grounds the most ambitious and all-encompassing 
understanding of naturalism. Of course, Spinoza’s claim is metaphysical — here 
again the first piece of secular metaphysics. His naturalism is hardly matched 
by contemporary naturalistic accounts that are scarcely convincing, and often 
simply ideological. 
32 Id. 
33 I hope the irony is clear: men create a God in their own image, only to say 
that they are the only divine creatures on earth because human beings alone 
resemble God — that is, they are divine because they resemble themselves. 
Spinoza does not suggest that human beings are unique or distinctive because 
of a special capacity for self-determination, as suggested by Grotius and the 
natural lawyers. Human beings are just another form of life on earth with finite 
motion and finite understanding. There is no dualism between mind and body: 
the two are of exactly the same matter and they are completely integrated.
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that human beings have no easy way in which they can uncover the natural 
order (and causality) of the world because their cognitive faculties are limited. 
Finally, Spinoza’s account develops an immanent political monism (IPM). 
IPM explains the way in which people come together to organize a life in 
common and set up political institutions to maintain a certain degree of order 
and stability despite human irrationality. Human beings come together and 
form political communities as a matter of necessity: they instinctively know 
that to form bonds is much more likely to serve their interest in survival, and 
it is also likely to enhance one’s own control over the external world. Political 
institutions are thus created to protect those basic human interests and as long 
as they are capable of serving those interests, they protect their existence. If 
political institutions start behaving in a way that undermines those basic human 
interests, then they become exposed to failure and ultimately to extinction. 
Thus, to establish peace and stability, any political authority has to rely 
on a double account. On the one hand, one needs a metaphysical account of 
reality that frees human beings from a transcendental dimension. On the other, 
one needs a practical psychological account that is capable of motivating 
human beings. Spinoza’s naturalism imagines a world of causal relations that 
are at bottom all ordered in a monistic immanent frame. Human beings can 
have glimpses of this order, but can never achieve a full picture that takes 
them back to the single original cause. This is what I call an evolutionary 
naturalism, because it opens a wide space for scientific explanations of the 
world and firmly resituates human beings within nature and not as endowed 
with special godly features. When Hobbes regards rights as being alienable, 
he is betraying his own naturalism and attributing normative properties to 
human beings that can only be explained by a theological account that regards 
human beings as being endowed by God with special moral powers. Spinoza 
resists that normative move and insists on a purely naturalistic ethics. 
B. The Natural and the Normative
In Spinoza, the connection between the natural and the normative is made 
through his very peculiar conception of law, which is itself dual.34 There are 
two types of laws: descriptive and prescriptive. Laws of nature are descriptive: 
they are the only true laws, because they are the only ones that depend on 
the real order of the world. They are metaphysically basic, since everything 
in this world happens in accordance with strict laws of nature. Divine laws, 
for example, are descriptive: they are the basic laws of nature, since God is 
34 baruCh sPinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, in ComPlete works, supra 
note 30, at 426.
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Nature. This allows Spinoza to offer a deep reinterpretation of ius and lex. 
For Spinoza, lex reflects primarily the understanding of an eternal order. Ius, 
on the contrary, is the expression of human will and forms the basis of the 
second type of laws — prescriptive laws — which is parasitic upon the first 
type. Human beings need prescriptive laws because they are limited by their 
own very nature, and have no cognitive ability to know the real order of the 
world. Thus, in order to orient themselves and find guidance, they have to 
impose rules on themselves to make sure that their existence gives at least 
the impression of order. 
It is common to define human laws as quintessentially prescriptive, and 
ultimately independent of descriptive laws, the laws of nature, which include 
the laws of human psychology. Spinoza believes, on the contrary, that we 
should unveil the deep connection between descriptive and prescriptive 
laws.35 Effective prescriptive human laws are those that grasp the existence of 
descriptive laws of nature: human beings are driven to form communities in 
order to strengthen their own position. Political institutions are responsive to the 
immediate needs of human communities: to the extent that they preserve stable 
human relations, they are successful. Human communities need prescriptive 
laws in order to make sure that they do not fall prey to their negative emotional 
reactions. Effective human laws have an important psychological component 
in motivating human beings to act together towards the preservation of 
stability and peace. 
It is important to stress that the link between the natural and the normative 
is not straightforward. A few points are in order: First, the connection is not 
direct; human beings have no access to the knowledge of all the causes; they 
only have a very fragmentary knowledge of nature and its own causal laws. 
Second, the impossibility of knowledge of descriptive laws points to the 
inherent limits of human rationality, which can at best work under less-than-
ideal conditions of limited knowledge. Third, limited rationality means that 
human beings reach practical decisions on the basis of emotional reactions to 
the natural world. Prescriptive human laws have to engage with psychological 
motivations and provide appropriate answers to them. Fourth, the success of 
a rule-maker will be measured by its ability to grasp the overarching interest 
of the community, while at the same time motivating people to strive together 
in that direction. When the sovereign authority gives to their community an 
appropriate set of rules, the community is likely to persevere in its existence 
and flourish. The ruler shows on this occasion that he understands both the 
35 This is an insight present both in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, id., and 
later in montesQuieu, the sPirit oF the laws (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn 
Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
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real interest that lies in the exercise of power and the necessity to motivate 
the people to comply with the rules in order to further their own interest. 
Conversely, a sovereign authority that does not understand the higher interest 
of the commonwealth, or that is incapable of motivating people to pursue that 
interest, is bound to fail. Spinoza’s understanding of sovereign authority is 
dynamic and evolutionary. Political authority is sovereign when it understands 
the interests of the community. It thrives when those interests are protected and 
promoted; it declines when it is no longer capable of efficiently maintaining 
those interests. 
C. An Evolutionary Account of State Sovereignty
Human laws are there to secure the existence of the state. As long as the state is 
capable of understanding what it takes to motivate the people to obey, human 
laws will assist in making the state stronger and more stable. Spinoza must 
be contrasted with Hobbes on this crucial point. Hobbes insists that political 
stability depends on the subject; each individual is a potential source of 
endless conflicts and violence. If human beings want to live in a peaceful and 
secure environment, they have to give up their natural right through consent. 
The commonwealth will promote those goods in the name of the people. 
Spinoza disagrees: political stability depends on the commonwealth in the 
first place. When the people do not comply with the rules and obligations 
of the community, they are not to be blamed. It is the responsibility of the 
commonwealth to create a political community where compliance is possible 
and largely respected.36 A sovereign state must govern wisely and promulgate 
wise norms, if it cares about peace and security, and if it wants to maintain its 
rule. If it is not capable of doing so, the sovereign will simply incur growing 
unrest and ultimately rebellion. To be sure, the responsibility for that has to 
be placed on the ruler and not on the subjects.37 
The contrast between Spinoza and Hobbes is particularly interesting when 
it comes to understanding the place and role of the state today. The Hobbesian 
insists that the state is the basic framework of justice; outside of which there 
is no order.38 But this assumes that no order can be achieved in any other 
36 baruCh sPinoza, Political Treaty (5/3), in ComPlete works, supra note 30, at 
699.
37 This Spinozistic point is central in montesQuieu, supra note 35.
38 nagel, supra note 26. For a critical reply showing the limits of the Hobbesian 
account, see Cohen & Sabel, supra note 26. Nagel now accepts the force of 
Cohen and Sabel’s argument which shows that we no longer live in a Hobbesian 
world. 
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way.39 Such a static account also fails to explain the fact that the state may not 
be capable of solving present global challenges. The problem begins when 
the state is no longer capable of providing the adequate responses to global 
problems of coordination. An evolutionary account points out the contingency 
of the state: it will last as long as it works. Perhaps, at one point, it will be 
supplanted, just as the nation-state supplanted the Church, the Empire and 
the cities as temporal authorities. The state itself has been, and remains, a 
highly malleable and variable form of association, so it is likely to evolve so 
as to cope with new challenges. Hitherto, it has been remarkably resilient. As 
Wolfgang Friedmann observed, “[f]rom the sixteenth to the early twentieth 
century, the national state, in many cases coalescing from the older and 
smaller entities of dukedoms, principalities, and city republics, became the 
sole source of legal power and the exclusive focus of political allegiance.”40 
D. Obligations Beyond the Sovereign State
Today, the emergence of international institutions and transnational forms of 
regulation is helping to solve problems that escape the state’s centrality in the 
global arena. They also lead to rethinking the static character of sovereignty. 
The state still performs valuable functions in screening the people from 
unwanted internal and external forces. When the state works, it prevents the 
imposition of worldviews that are not shared by the people as a whole or as 
a minority. For example, it prevents the imposition of a religion over others. 
But when it does not work, its survival and flourishing are at stake, because 
people do not feel protected by the state and other forces exercise pressure 
on citizens. When the state is not capable of performing vital protective tasks 
through its municipal laws, then other interested groups push forward their 
agenda through forms of coordination that are not state-made. Today’s global 
crisis cannot be met by the state alone; the state is also struggling to create 
international cooperation in order to tackle common problems. It is true that 
for the moment there is no alternative political framework to the nation-state; 
even supranational institutions such as the European Union are there to sustain 
rather than undermine the nation-state.41 In order to explain the reality of actual 
obligations that states have at the global level, I have distinguished between 
the Hobbesian view, which I deem a static understanding of state sovereignty, 
and an evolutionary naturalistic account of state sovereignty that posits the 
39 nagel, supra note 26. 
40 Joel traChtman, the Future oF international law 11 (2013).
41 alan milwarD, the euroPean resCue oF the nation state (2d ed. 2000).
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contingency of the national state and its power. Its power is justified only 
to the extent that it fulfils its job better than any other political framework. 
An evolutionary explanation of the state presents obligations towards other 
actors as being grounded not on moral concerns, but on the self-interest in 
the preservation and flourishing of the state itself. A state has power insofar 
that it is capable of surviving, but loses that power as soon as it is no longer 
capable of doing that. Its right to rule is co-extensive with its power. An 
evolutionary account also attempts to move away from an explanation of 
the obligations of the state grounded on respect for God’s moral law, or on 
the abstract moral truths discovered through reason. However, to deny that 
there is any transcendental standard of justice is not to deny that there is 
any standard by which action can be evaluated. The actions of the state, in 
particular those actions that contribute to the promotion of global stability, 
can be evaluated in the light of whether the action preserves and promotes 
one’s existence and power of action. In a world where global relations are 
increasingly more important, a state that is regarded as a strong collaborative 
player will increase its power of action. To this extent, the obligations of 
states can be grounded on the state’s very interest rather than on more or less 
vague moral notions. For example, the obligations that European states have 
decided to impose on themselves through the creation of the European Union 
are there to strengthen the system of states rather than weaken it. 
As far as obligations between states are concerned, an evolutionary approach 
will deny that there are any independent normative constraints on the actions 
of states. It suggests instead that the survival of states relies on their ability 
to provide answers to transnational problems. For example, the way in which 
Italy deals with the problem of immigration from North Africa will have an 
impact on the whole country. Italy has to make sure that immigration can 
be regulated so as to avoid the breakdown of its system of assistance. Other 
European states have an interest in the success of immigration policies. The 
existence of international obligations is not a matter of morality, but a matter 
of survival. This may in turn create new regional institutions with the actual 
authority to deal with immigration, since states on their own are struggling. In 
the end, whatever institutions which are capable of offering a stable solution 
to the problem will be vested with power that is independent from the state. 
This may happen in an increasing number of areas of life and state sovereignty 
will proportionately decrease, perhaps to the point of disappearing. 
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conclusIon 
Any genealogical study of state sovereignty attempts to uncover the origins 
of an idea in order to understand its trajectory. I have tried to show that 
sovereignty has a theological root, Jerusalem; the idea of the state came about 
as a practical and effective response to the vacuum of political authority in 
Europe. Philosophers have tended to engage with the theological issue, and 
dismissed Machiavelli’s insights on the reality of power. Instead, they relied 
on reason — Athens — to advocate allegedly objective normative standards 
binding the state morally. But this naïve understanding of political authority 
and international obligations (Grotius) was quickly replaced by a more ruthless 
conception of state sovereignty as the guarantee for the safety and security of 
the community. In Hobbes’s secular account, Jerusalem and Athens are both to 
be subjected to the sovereign authority of the state. However, Hobbes’s position 
preserves fundamental elements of both Jerusalem and Athens, which end up 
corrupting his Roman understanding of state sovereignty. Even if Hobbes’s 
view is still extremely appealing to all those who regard the international 
sphere as hopelessly devoid of order, the truth of the matter is that modern 
states are increasingly at greater pains to exercise their authority effectively to 
respond to global problems. At the same time, international and transnational 
obligations are flourishing despite the existence of the state, and this calls 
for an explanation of both the decline of the state and the emergence of new 
forms of regulation. To do so, I developed an evolutionary explanation of state 
sovereignty that departs from Hobbes’s and claims to be true to the original 
Roman insight of Machiavelli, while being completely free of Jerusalem. In 
particular, I offered Spinoza’s account of state sovereignty as being capable 
of explaining how and why political authorities appear, flourish and decline. 
In times of political vacuum at the global level, what matters is not what 
best justifies the actions of political institutions; rather, what matters is how 
effective new political institutions are in delivering on their promises. The 
national state may be here to stay, and it is perhaps the main political framework 
to guarantee a relative degree of peace and stability. If that is the case, it 
is not because the state is morally better than other political frameworks, 
but because it can exercise its authority more expediently. In this picture, 
Rome has completely erased Jerusalem, and has put Athens in its place: as 
a separate source of criticism and observation of political authority, rather 
than the ultimate justification thereof. The practice of power provides the 
most fundamental reasons as to how to exercise power. A sovereign state that 
does not understand its interest in collaborating with other states to provide 
answers to pressing global problems is first and foremost undermining its 
chances of future survival. 
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There is something odd about believing that the state provides a necessary 
framework of justified ultimate political authority in a territorially bounded 
space. Other political frameworks existed before, and others will emerge 
and compete with the national state. Indeed, the fact that there is increasing 
competition means that the state is less than fully capable of exercising its own 
authority effectively; it points to an increasing political vacuum that needs 
to be filled somehow. However, we are unlikely to see a quick demise of the 
state because of three practical reasons singled out by Joel Trachtman42: (1) 
the state continues to provide solutions to many coordination problems that 
fit well within its borders; (2) path dependence makes it difficult to shift to 
another system; and (3) network externalities support isomorphism among 
states. The first is the most important force. 
It may be early days to conclude that the political framework of the 
sovereign state is nearing its end. But it is high time to start explaining state 
sovereignty, and examining the nature and scope of obligations upon the state, 
from an evolutionary viewpoint rather than a moralistic or theological one. 
When Rome is interpreted in purely political and secular terms, it points to the 
strongest form of authority, one capable of responding to global challenges. 
Athens and Jerusalem will wait to see which authority emerges to cast their 
judgment on it. 
42 traChtman, supra note 40, at 10.
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